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Nearly two years after the official end of the "Great Recession," the labor market remains historically
weak. One candidate explanation is supply-side effects driven by dramatic expansions of Unemployment
Insurance (UI) benefit durations, to as many as 99 weeks. This paper investigates the effect of these
UI extensions on job search and reemployment. I use the longitudinal structure of the Current Population
Survey to construct unemployment exit hazards that vary across states, over time, and between individuals
with differing unemployment durations. I then use these hazards to explore a variety of comparisons
intended to distinguish the effects of UI extensions from other determinants of employment outcomes.
The various specifications yield quite similar results. UI extensions had significant but small negative
effects on the probability that the eligible unemployed would exit unemployment, concentrated among
the long-term unemployed. The estimates imply that UI benefit extensions raised the unemployment
rate in early 2011 by only about 0.1-0.5 percentage points, much less than is implied by previous analyses,
with at least half of this effect attributable to reduced labor force exit among the unemployed rather
than to the changes in reemployment rates that are of greater policy concern.
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While the so-called “Great Recession” oﬃcially ended in June 2009, the labor market remains
stagnant. In September 2011, the unemployment rate remained above nine percent — it
has fallen below that threshold for only 2 of the last 29 months — and nearly 45% of the
unemployed had been out of work for more than six months.
An important part of the policy response to the Great Recession has been a dramatic
expansion of Unemployment Insurance (UI) beneﬁts. Preexisting law provided for up to
26 weeks of beneﬁts, plus up to 20 additional weeks of "Extended Beneﬁts" (EB) in states
experiencing high unemployment rates. But Congress has frequently authorized additional
weeks on an ad hoc basis in past recessions, and starting in June 2008 it enacted a series of
UI extensions that brought statutory beneﬁt durations to as long as 99 weeks.
Unemployment beneﬁts subsidize continued unemployment. Thus, it seems likely that
the unprecedented UI extensions have contributed to some degree to the elevated unemploy-
ment rate. However, the magnitude and interpretation of this eﬀect is not clear. Several
recent analyses have found that extensions of UI beneﬁts contributed around 1.0 percent-
age points to the unemployment rate in 2010 and early 2011 (see, e.g., Mazumder, 2011;
Valetta and Kuang, 2010; Fujita, 2011), while some observers have claimed that the eﬀects
were several times that size (Grubb, 2011; Barro, 2010).
There are two channels by which UI can raise unemployment, with very diﬀerent policy
implications (Solon, 1979). On the one hand, UI extensions can lead recipients to reduce
their search eﬀort and raise their reservation wages, slowing the transition into employment.
On the other hand, UI beneﬁts — which are available only to those engaged in active job
search — also provide an incentive for continued search for those who might otherwise have
exited the labor force. The latter raises measured unemployment but has no eﬀect — or
possibly even a positive eﬀect — on the reemployment of displaced workers. Based in part
on this observation, Howell and Azizoglu (2011) ﬁnd “no support” for the view that UI
extensions have reduced employment. Unfortunately, most studies of the eﬀect of UI on the
duration of unemployment have been unable to distinguish the two channels.
Uncovering the causal eﬀect of UI extensions on labor market outcomes is diﬃcult be-
2cause these extensions are badly endogenous by design — UI beneﬁts are extended in severe
recessions precisely because it is seen as unreasonable to demand that workers ﬁnd jobs
quickly when the labor market is weak. Thus, obtaining a credible estimate of the eﬀect of
the recent UI extensions requires a strategy for distinguishing this eﬀect from the confound-
ing inﬂuence of historically weak labor demand.
This paper uses the haphazard roll-out of the EUC and EB programs during the Great
Recession to identify the partial equilibrium eﬀects of the recent UI extensions on the labor
market outcomes of workers who have been displaced from their previous jobs and are
actively seeking new ones. I use the longitudinal structure of the Current Population Survey
to construct hazard rates for unemployment exit, reemployment, and labor force exit that
vary across states, over time, and between individuals displaced at diﬀerent dates.
I explore a variety of strategies for isolating the causal eﬀects of UI extensions. One
strategy exploits the gradual rollout and repeated expiration of EUC beneﬁts through suc-
cessive federal legislation to generate variation in beneﬁt durations across labor markets
facing plausibly similar demand conditions. Second, as in Valetta and Kuang (2010), I use
UI-ineligible job seekers as a control group for eligible unemployed workers in the same
state-month labor markets. A third strategy exploits state decisions to take up or decline
optional EB provisions that alter the availability of EB beneﬁts, using a “control function”
to distinguish the eﬀects of the economic conditions that deﬁne eligibility. Finally, I exploit
diﬀerences in remaining beneﬁt eligibility among UI-eligible workers displaced at diﬀerent
times but searching for work in the same labor markets to identify the eﬀect of approaching
beneﬁt exhaustion.
All of the strategies point to broadly similar conclusions. The availability of extended UI
beneﬁts caused small reductions in the probability that unemployed workers exited unem-
ployment, reducing the monthly hazard in the fourth quarter of 2010 — when the average
unemployed worker anticipated a total beneﬁt duration of 65 weeks — by between one and
three percentage points on a base of 22.4%. Not more than half of the unemployment
exit eﬀect comes from eﬀects on reemployment: My preferred speciﬁcation indicates that
UI extensions reduced the average monthly reemployment hazard of unemployed displaced
workers in 2010:Q4 by 0.5 percentage points (on a base of 13.4%), and reduced the monthly
3labor force exit hazard by 1.0 percentage points (on a base of 9.0%).
The labor force exit eﬀect raises the possibility that UI extensions might actually raise
the employment rate of formerly displaced workers in bad economic times, by extending
the time until they abandon their search.1 However, estimating this eﬀect requires strong
assumptions, along with ad hoc corrections for shortcomings in the data. Using such as-
sumptions and corrections, I simulate the eﬀect of the 2008-2010 UI extensions on aggregate
unemployment and on the long-term unemployment share. All of the estimates are partial
equilibrium, as I assume that reduced job search from one worker has no eﬀect on the search
behavior or job-ﬁnding rate of any other worker. This almost certainly leads me to overstate
the eﬀect of UI extensions.
Nevertheless, I ﬁnd quite small eﬀects. My preferred speciﬁcation indicates that in the
absence of unemployment insurance extensions, the unemployment rate in December 2010
would have been about 0.2 percentage points lower and the long-term share of the unem-
ployed would have been about 1.6 percentage points lower. Even the speciﬁcation yielding
the largest eﬀects indicates that UI extensions contributed only 0.5 percentage points to the
unemployment rate. Moreover, simulations that include only the labor force participation
eﬀects yield estimates at least half as large as do simulations with both participation and
reemployment eﬀects, suggesting that reduced job search due to UI extensions raised the
unemployment rate by only 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews recent labor
market trends and discusses the UI extensions that have been an important part of the
policy response. It also presents a simple model of the eﬀects of UI beneﬁt durations and
discusses existing estimates of the eﬀect of the recent extensions. Section 3 discusses the
longitudinally-linked CPS data that I use to study the eﬀects of UI. Section 4 presents my
empirical strategies for isolating the UI eﬀect. Section 5 presents estimates of the eﬀect of
UI beneﬁt durations on the unemployment exit hazard. Section 6 develops a simulation
methodology that I use to extrapolate these estimates to obtain eﬀects on labor market
1In addition, UI may reduce hysteresis by increasing labor force attachment and thereby slowing the
deterioration of job skills. If so, UI extensions could make displaced workers more employable when demand
recovers. A related possibility is that UI extensions may deter displaced workers from claiming disability
payments (Duggan and Imberman, 2009; Joint Economic Committee, 2010).
4aggregates, and presents results. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Labor Market and Unemployment Insurance in the
Great Recession
2.1 Labor market trends
The recession oﬃcially began in December 2007, but the downturn was slow at ﬁrst: Sea-
sonally adjusted U.S. real GDP fell at an annual rate of only 0.7 percent in the ﬁrst quarter
of 2008. Conditions worsened sharply in late 2008 and GDP contracted at an annual rate
of 6.8 percent in the fourth quarter.
The labor market downturn also began slowly. Figure 1 shows that the unemployment
rate began trending up in 2007, but remained only 5.8% in July 2008. Over the next year,
however, it rose 3.7 percentage points, to 9.5 percent, and has fallen below 9 percent in only
two months since. Employment data show similar trends: Non-farm payroll employment
rose through most of 2007, fell by 738,000 in the ﬁrst half of 2008, and then fell by nearly
6.8 million over the next year. Job losses continued at slower rates in the second half of
2009, followed by modest and inconsistent growth in 2010. As of August 2011, employment
remained 6.9 million below its pre-recession peak.
Figure 1 also shows the long-term unemployment rate, deﬁned as the share of the un-
employed who have been out of work for six months or more. It generally lags the overall
unemployment rate by about six months or perhaps a bit more: It began to increase slowly
in early 2008 and much more quickly in late 2008, reaching a peak around 45% in early 2010
— nearly twenty percentage points higher than the previous record of 25.7%, recorded in
June 1983 — and remaining mostly stable since then.
Figures 2A and 2B illustrate gross labor market ﬂows over the course of the reces-
sion. These are obtained from two sources: The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey
(JOLTS), which derives from employer reports, and the gross ﬂows research series computed
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from matched monthly Current Population Survey (CPS)
household data discussed at length below. Figure 2A shows ﬂows out of work: Quits and
5layoﬀs from the JOLTS (“other separations,” including retirements, are not shown), and
gross employment to unemployment (E-U) ﬂows from the CPS. Figure 2B shows ﬂows into
work: Hires from the JOLTS and unemployment to employment (U-E) ﬂows from the CPS.
It also shows unemployment to non-participation (U-N) ﬂows, with both the U-E and U-N
ﬂows expressed as shares of the previous month’s unemployed population.
Together, Figures 2A and 2B shed a good deal of light on the dynamics of the rise
and stagnation of the unemployment rate.2 Figure 2A shows that layoﬀs spiked and quits
collapsed in late 2008, indicating an extreme weakening of labor demand; interestingly, the
decline in quits seems to have preceded the increase in layoﬀs by several months. Not
surprisingly, the number of monthly employment-to-unemployment transitions increased by
about one-third over the course of 2008. Layoﬀs returned to (or even below) normal levels
in late 2009, but quits remained just over half of their pre-recession level and E-U ﬂows
remained high, suggesting that weak demand continued to dissuade workers from leaving
their jobs and to impede the usual quick transition of displaced workers into new jobs.
Turning to Figure 2B, we see that the collapse in new hires was more gradual than
the spike in layoﬀs and began much earlier, in late 2007. The rate at which unemployed
workers transitioned into employment also began to decline at this time, then fell much
more sharply in late 2008. Recall that the rapid run-up in long-term unemployment was
in mid-2009, roughly six months later, again suggesting that the usual process by which
displaced workers are recycled into new jobs was substantially disrupted around the time
of the ﬁnancial crisis. U-E ﬂows remain very low through the present day. Finally, the
U-N ﬂow rate fell rather than rose during the recession, despite weak labor demand which
might plausibly have led unemployed workers to become discouraged. This is plausibly a
consequence of Unemployment Insurance beneﬁt extensions, which created incentives for
ongoing search even if the prospect of ﬁnding a job was remote.
2.2 The policy response
Congress responded quickly to the deteriorating labor market, authorizing Emergency Un-
employment Compensation (EUC) beneﬁts in June 2008, but proceeded in ﬁts and starts
2See Elsby et al. (2010) for a more detailed examination of these and other aggregate data.
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who exhausted his or her regular beneﬁts before March 28, 2009. The EUC program was
subsequently expanded in November 2008. That expansion brought basic EUC beneﬁts to
20 weeks, and also added a second “tier” of 13 weeks of beneﬁts in states with unemployment
rates above 6%. A second expansion in November 2009 changed Tier II beneﬁts to 14 weeks
and added Tiers III, 13 weeks of beneﬁts when the unemployment rate was above 6%, and
Tier IV, an additional 6 weeks when the unemployment rate was above 8%. Adding the four
tiers together, individuals in high-unemployment states were eligible for 53 weeks of EUC
beneﬁts. Columns 1-4 of Table 1 show the number of tiers and number of weeks available
over time.
The EUC program was originally set to expire on March 28, 2009. However, the program
was reauthorized several times to delay the scheduled expiration. Column 5 of Table 1
shows the scheduled expiration date of EUC beneﬁts over time. For much of the program’s
history, the expiration date was quite close. Indeed, on three occasions, in April, June, and
November of 2010, Congress allowed the program to expire. Each time, Congress eventually
reauthorized it retroactive to the expiration date, but in June this took seven weeks.
The EUC program complemented a preexisting program, Extended Beneﬁts (EB), that
allowed for 13 or 20 weeks of extra beneﬁts in states with elevated unemployment rates. EB
is an optional program, and participating states can choose among several options regarding
the speciﬁc triggers that will activate EB beneﬁts. As costs are traditionally split evenly
between the state and the federal government, many states have opted not to participate or
have chosen relatively stringent triggers. However, the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of (February) 2009 provided for full Federal funding of EB beneﬁts. This induced a
number of states to begin participating in the program and to adopt more generous triggers.4
Figure 3 shows the number of states in which EB beneﬁts have been available over time,
along with simulated counts of the number of weeks that would have been available had
every state adopted minimal or maximal triggers. At the beginning of 2009, only three
3This discussion draws heavily on Fujita (2010). I neglect a number of details of the UI program rules. In
particular, claimants whose previous jobs were short are not eligible for the full 26 weeks of regular beneﬁts
or for the indicated number of weeks of EUC beneﬁts.
4The Recovery Act also provided for tax deductibility of a portion of UI beneﬁts, for somewhat expanded
eligibility, and for more generous weekly beneﬁts.
7states oﬀered EB beneﬁts, but by July of that year beneﬁts were available in 35 states.
Figure 3 shows that this reﬂected a combination of increased EB participation — which
brought the “actual” series well above the “minimal” series — and deteriorating economic
conditions that would have expanded EB participation even with ﬁxed triggers.5 The Figure
also shows that participation plummeted each time the EUC program was allowed to expire:
A number of states wrote their EB implementing legislation to provide for state participation
only as long as the federal government paid 100% of the cost, and this provision expired
and was reauthorized each time along with EUC. Other than these spikes, participation has
been relatively stable over time.
A ﬁnal feature of Figure 3 is that there is a wide disparity between the simulated “min-
imal” and “maximal” series, with relatively few states — and none after mid-2010 — quali-
fying for beneﬁts under the least generous triggers but nearly all states qualifying under the
most generous options. Thus, Alabama and Mississippi, each with total unemployment rates
of 10.4 percent but insured unemployment rates below 4 percent, both qualiﬁed under max-
imal triggers but not minimal triggers in January 2010; because Alabama had adopted the
most generous optional triggers but Mississippi had not, unemployed individuals in Alabama
were eligible for 20 weeks of EB beneﬁts but those in Mississippi were ineligible.
Combining regular beneﬁts (26 weeks), EUC (as many as 53 weeks) and EB (as many
as 20 weeks), statutory beneﬁt durations have reached as long as 99 weeks in many states.
However, this overstates the number of weeks that any individual claimant could expect.
According to EUC program rules, after the program expires participants can draw out the
remaining beneﬁts from any tier already started but cannot transition to the next tier.
Throughout 2010, the expiration date of the program was never more than a few months
away. Thus, no individual exhausting her regular beneﬁts in 2010 could have anticipated
5During the period covered by my sample, “minimal” triggers provided EB beneﬁts only when the 13-week
moving average of the insured unemployment rate (IUR) was at least 5% and above 120% of the maximum
of its values one year and two years prior. It is this lookback period that accounts for the decline in the
minimal series in late 2009. “Maximal” triggers also provided beneﬁts in states with 13-week IURs above
6% (regardless of their lagged values) or with three-month moving average total unemployment rates (TUR;
the traditional measure) above 6.5% and 110% of the value either one or two years prior. Each simulated
beneﬁts series allows a state’s status to change no more than once in 13 weeks, following program rules; the
maximal series also assumes that the optional 3-year lookback was adopted when it became available in 2011.
See National Employment Law Project (2011) and Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1970 (Undated).
8being able to draw beneﬁts from EUC Tiers III or IV absent further Congressional action.
It is not clear how to model workers’ expectations in the weeks prior to a scheduled
EUC expiration. They might reasonably have expected an extension, if only to smooth the
“cliﬀ” in beneﬁts that would otherwise be created. However, each extension has been highly
controversial, facing determined opposition and ﬁlibusters in the Senate. It would have been
quite a leap of faith in mid 2010, in the midst of a Republican resurgence, for an unemployed
worker to assume that the program would be extended beyond its November 30 expiration.
Moreover, even a worker who foresaw an eventual extension might (correctly) have expected
a gap in beneﬁts between the program’s expiration and its eventual reauthorization. For
a UI recipient facing binding credit constraints, beneﬁts paid retroactively are much less
valuable than those paid on time.
Figure 4 provides two ways of looking at the evolution of UI durations. The left panel
shows estimates for the state with the longest beneﬁt durations at any point in time. After
late 2008, this is a state qualifying for 20 weeks of EB beneﬁts and all extant EUC tiers. The
right panel shows the (unweighted) average across states. In each panel, the short dashes
show the maximum number of weeks available by statute over time, while the long dashes
and the solid line show the expectations of a worker just entering unemployment and of a
worker who has just exhausted her regular beneﬁts, respectively, under the assumption that
workers do not anticipate future EUC extensions or trigger events.
The “statutory” series shows a rapid run-up, due primarily to EUC expansions and
secondarily to EB triggers, in 2008 and throughout 2009, followed by repeated collapses in
2010 when the EUC program temporarily expired. However, the other two series show much
more gradual changes from the perspective of individuals early in their allowed beneﬁts.
Newly displaced workers who did not expect further legislative action would have seen the
EUC program as largely irrelevant for most of its existence, as only on three occasions
(roughly, the 3rd quarter of 2008, the 2nd quarter of 2009, and the period since December
2010) was the expiration of the EUC program farther away than the 26 weeks it would take
for a newly displaced worker to exhaust his regular beneﬁts. Workers already exhausting
their regular beneﬁts, by contrast, would have anticipated at least Tier I beneﬁts at all times
except during the temporary sunsets. Even these workers, however, could not look forward
9to Tier II, III, or IV beneﬁts for most of the history of the program. It is only in December
2010 and the very beginning of 2011 that any such worker could anticipate eligibility for
Tier IV beneﬁts. A ﬁnal feature to notice is that the average state was quite close to the
maximum from 2009 on, as most states had adopted at least one of the EB options and
most had hit their triggers.
2.3 A model of job search and UI durations
To ﬁx ideas, I develop a simple discrete time model of job search with exogenous wages and
time-limited unemployment insurance. The model yields two main results: First, search
intensity rises as UI beneﬁt expiration approaches, and is higher for UI exhaustees than for
those still receiving beneﬁts. Thus, an extension of UI beneﬁts reduces the reemployment
chances of searching individuals, both those who have exhausted their regular beneﬁts and
those who are still drawing regular beneﬁts and thus not directly aﬀected by the extension.
Second, when UI beneﬁt receipt is conditioned on continuing job search, beneﬁt extensions
can raise the probability of search continuation. Both results imply positive eﬀects of beneﬁt
extensions on measured unemployment. However, because the second channel can increase
search, the net eﬀect on the reemployment of displaced workers is ambiguous.
I assume that individuals cannot borrow or save.6 The income — and therefore the
consumption — of an unemployed individual is y0 if she does not receive UI beneﬁts and
y0 + b if she does. Her per-period ﬂow utility is u(c)   s, where c is her consumption and
s is the amount of eﬀort she devotes to search. If she ﬁnds a job, it will be permanent
and will oﬀer an exogenous wage w > y0 + b and ﬂow utility u(w). The probability that
she ﬁnds a job in a period is an increasing function of search eﬀort, p(s), with p0 (s) > 0,
p00 (s) < 0, p(0) = 0, p0 (0) = 1, and p(s) < 1 for all s. Although p(s) might naturally be
modeled as a function of changing labor market conditions, to avoid excessive complexity
from dynamic anticipation eﬀects I assume that job seekers treat it as ﬁxed. I assume that
unemployment beneﬁts are available for up to D periods of unemployment. Initially, I model
these as conditional only on continued unemployment; later, I condition also on a minimum
6Chetty (2008) ﬁnds that much of the search eﬀect of unemployment insurance is concentrated among
those who are credit constrained, and also that lump-sum severance pay has a similar eﬀect to UI beneﬁt
extensions (see also Card et al., 2007a).
10level of search eﬀort.
These assumptions lead to a dynamic decision problem with state variable d correspond-
ing to the number of weeks of beneﬁts remaining. Letting VU (d) represent the value function
of an unemployed individual with d > 0 weeks of beneﬁts remaining, the Bellman equation
is
VU (d) = max
sd
u(y0 + b)   sd +  [p(sd)VE + (1   p(sd))VU (d   1)]; (1)
where sd represents the chosen search eﬀort, VE is the value function of an employed worker,
and 1    is the per-week discount rate.7
The ﬁrst order condition then implies that the search eﬀort choice satisﬁes
p0 (sd) =
1
 (VE   VU (d   1))
for d  1. The following results are proved in an appendix.
Proposition 1. The value function VU (d) is increasing in d: VU (d + 1) > VU (d) for all
d  0.
Proposition 2. Search eﬀort increases as exhaustion approaches, reaching its ﬁnal level in
the penultimate period of beneﬁt receipt: sd+1 < sd < s1 = s0 for all d  2.
Proposition 2 implies that unemployment insurance extensions will reduce job-ﬁnding
rates at all unemployment durations below the new maximum beneﬁt duration D and will
shift the time-until-reemployment distribution rightward. The relative magnitude of the
eﬀect at diﬀerent unemployment durations depends on the shape of the p() function, but
under plausible parameterizations (sd 1   sd) declines with d so beneﬁt extensions will have
the largest eﬀects on the search eﬀort of those who would otherwise be at or near exhaustion.8
These results neglect the impact of UI job search requirements. To incorporate them,
I assume that an individual is considered a part of the labor force and therefore eligible
to receive UI beneﬁts only if his search eﬀort is at least  > 0. Those who choose lower
7Once beneﬁts are exhausted (d = 0), the problem becomes stationary: VU (0) = maxs0 u(y0)   s0 +
 [p(s0)VE + (1   p(s0))VU (0)].
8For example, this holds under the parameters considered by Chetty (2008, p. 8), which in my notation
correspond to CRRA utility u(c) =
c1 
1  with  = 1:75, y0 = 0:25w, b = 0:5w, p(s) = 0:25s
0:9,  = 1, and
VE = 500u(w).
11search receive no beneﬁt payments but preserve their beneﬁt entitlements (that is, d is not
decremented). The Bellman equation for an individual with d > 0 weeks remaining is now:





u(b)   s + 
h
p(s)VE + (1   p(s)) ~ VU (d   1)
i
if s  
u(0)   s + 
h
p(s)VE + (1   p(s)) ~ VU (d)
i
if s < :
(2)
Unemployment beneﬁts may deter an unemployed individual from exiting the labor
force if search productivity is low (i.e., if p0 () < 1
(VE VU(d 1))) and if beneﬁt levels are
high relative to . It can be shown that:
Proposition 3. Any individual who chooses search eﬀort s   with d weeks of beneﬁts
remaining would also choose s   with d0 weeks remaining, for all d; d0 > 0.
Intuitively, an individual who chooses s <  when her UI entitlement has not yet been
exhausted does not use any of her remaining entitlement so the state variable, and therefore
the optimization problem, is the same the following week. She will thus never re-enter the
labor force. This then implies that the value of the state variable was irrelevant the previous
week, as remaining beneﬁt eligibility has no eﬀect on someone who will never search again.
The only temporally consistent policies are to exit the labor force immediately after a job
loss or to remain in the labor force at least until beneﬁts are exhausted.
UI beneﬁt extensions thus reduce non-participation by delaying the exit of those who
plan to exit when d reaches 0. This implies that the net eﬀect of UI extensions is ambiguous
when job search requirements are enforced: Those who would have searched intensively will
reduce their search eﬀort, while some of those who would have dropped out of the labor
force will increase their eﬀort. The relative strength of these two eﬀects is likely to vary over
the business cycle: When labor demand is strong and search productivity therefore high,
the negative eﬀect is likely to dominate, but when search productivity is low the former may
be more important.
Finally, it is worth mentioning two important factors that are not captured by this model.
First, p(s) may evolve over the business cycle. If p(s) is temporarily low but expected
to recover later, UI extensions might keep individuals searching through the low-demand
period. If search productivity is increasing in past search eﬀort, as is implied by many
12discussions of hysteresis, this could lead to higher employment when the economy recovers.
Even without state dependence in p(s), UI extensions may bring discouraged workers back
into the labor force earlier in the business cycle upswing. Second, I do not model search
externalities. Reduced search eﬀort from one person likely increases the productivity of
search for all others — if a UI recipient does not take an available job, this merely makes the
job available to someone else. This is particularly important if the labor market is demand
constrained, but arises anytime labor demand is downward sloping. In the presence of
search externalities, partial-equilibrium estimates of the eﬀect of UI extensions on recipients’
reemployment probabilities will overstate the aggregate eﬀects.
2.4 Prior estimates of the eﬀect of UI extensions in the Great Recession
There have been a number of estimates of the eﬀect of the recent UI extensions on labor
market outcomes. Nearly all involve extrapolations from pre-recession estimates of the eﬀect
of UI durations or from pre-recession unemployment exit rates.
Mazumder (2011) uses estimates of the eﬀect of UI durations from Katz and Meyer
(1990a) and Card and Levine (2000) to conclude that UI extensions contributed 0.8 to
1.2 percentage points to the unemployment rate in February 2011.9 But UI durations in
the current recession are longer and labor market conditions are diﬀerent in a variety of
ways than in the periods used for the earlier studies. The eﬀect of UI durations in the
earlier estimates largely reﬂects a spike in the unemployment exit hazard in the weeks
immediately prior to beneﬁt exhaustion. Katz and Meyer (1990b) ﬁnd that much of this
spike is attributable to laid oﬀ workers recalled to their previous job; these recalls are thought
to have become much less common in recent years. Card et al. (2007a,b) suggest that much of
the remaining spike is attributable to labor force exit rather than reemployment, highlighting
the importance of distinguishing these two channels.10
9Aaronson et al. (2010), Fujita (2010), and Elsby et al. (2010) use similar strategies and obtain similar
results.
10Another potential explanation for large spikes in at least some of the earlier studies is heaping in reported
unemployment durations. Katz (1986) and Sider (1985) suggest that in retrospective reports much of the
observed heaping — especially prominent at 26 weeks (or 6 months), the duration of regular UI beneﬁts —
reﬂects recall error or other factors (Card and Levine, 2000) rather than UI eﬀects.
13Fujita (2011) extrapolates from reemployment and labor force exit hazards observed in
2004-2007 to infer counterfactual hazards in 2009-2010 had UI beneﬁts not been extended.
To absorb confounding eﬀects from changes in labor demand, he controls linearly for the job
vacancy rate. He ﬁnds larger eﬀects of UI extensions on unemployment than does Mazumder
(2011), primarily attributable to reduced reemployment rather than reduced labor force exit.
However, these conclusions are based on the extrapolated eﬀects of a reduction in the job
vacancy rate that is roughly twice as large as the range observed in the earlier period.
Daly et al. (2011), drawing on Valetta and Kuang (2010), contrast changes in the unem-
ployment durations of job-losers, many of whom are eligible for UI beneﬁts, and job-leavers,
who are not, over the course of the recession. They conclude that UI extensions raised
the unemployment rate by 0.8 percentage points in 2009 and early 2010. This comparison
identiﬁes the UI eﬀect in the presence of arbitrary changes in demand conditions, so long as
the two groups are otherwise similar. However, the collapse in the quit rate seen in Figure
2A suggests that UI extensions may not be the only source of changes in the relative out-
comes of job losers and job leavers. If the remaining job leavers come largely from sectors
where job openings are plentiful while job losers come from those hit hard by the recession
(e.g., construction), the comparison between them will overstate any negative eﬀect of UI
extensions.
A larger estimate comes from Barro (2010), who assumes that the long-term unemploy-
ment rate in 2009 would have been the same as in 1983 if not for the UI extension. Barro
concludes that extensions raised the unemployment rate by 2.7 percentage points. Grubb’s
(2011) literature review comes to quite similar conclusion, while Howell and Azizoglu (2011)
conclude that any eﬀect is much smaller and primarily attributable to reduced labor force
exit induced by the UI job search requirement.
A ﬁnal relevant paper is by Farber and Valletta (2011). That paper was written simul-
taneously with and independently of this one, but pursues a similar strategy of using recent
data and competing risks models to identify the eﬀect of UI on reemployment and labor
force exit hazards. Unsurprisingly, Farber and Valletta obtain very similar results to those
presented below. Relative to Farber and Valletta, I (a) explore several alternative speci-
ﬁcations that isolate diﬀerent components of the variation in UI beneﬁts; (b) explore the
14sensitivity of the results to unavoidable ad hoc assumptions made about expected beneﬁt
availability; and (c) address an important discrepancy in the CPS data, discussed below,
that leads to drastic understatement of the long-term unemployment rate and that has the
potential to substantially obscure eﬀects of UI extensions on unemployment durations.
3 Data
I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) rotating panel to measure the labor market
outcomes of a large sample of unemployed workers in the very recent past. Three-quarters
of each month’s CPS sample is targeted for another interview the following month, and it is
possible to match over 70% of monthly respondents (94% of the attempted reinterviews) to
employment statuses in the following month. (The most important source of mismatches is
individuals who move, who are not followed.) This permits me to measure one-month-later
employment outcomes for roughly 4,000 unemployed workers each month during the Great
Recession, and thereby to construct monthly reemployment and labor force exit hazards
that vary by state, date of unemployment, and unemployment duration.
The CPS data have advantages and disadvantages relative to other data that have been
used to study UI eﬀects. Advantages include larger and more current samples, the ability to
track outcomes for individuals who have exhausted their UI beneﬁts or who are not eligible,
and the ability to distinguish reemployment from labor force exit.
These are oﬀset by important limitations. First, the monthly CPS does not contain
measures of UI eligibility or receipt. Only displaced workers — those who were laid oﬀ from
their previous jobs rather than having quit or being new entrants to the labor force — are
eligible for UI beneﬁts. Past research has found that less than half of the eligible unem-
ployed actually receive UI beneﬁts (Anderson and Meyer, 1997). This appears to have risen
somewhat in the current recession; I estimate that over half of displaced workers unemployed
more than three months in early 2010 received UI beneﬁts.11 Although the participation
rate is far less than 100%, I simulate remaining beneﬁt durations for all displaced workers,
11Observations in February, March, and April can be matched to data from the Annual Demographic
Survey, which includes questions about UI income in the previous calendar year. In early 2010, 56% of
job-leavers whose unemployment spells appear to have started before December 1, 2009 reported non-zero
UI income, up from 39% in early 2005.
15assuming that each is eligible for full beneﬁts. As I estimate relatively sparse speciﬁcations
without extensive individual controls, the estimates can be seen as the “reduced form” av-
erage eﬀect of available durations on the labor market outcomes of all displaced workers,
pooling recipients and non-recipients. To implement the simulation, I match the CPS data
to detailed information about the availability of EUC and EB beneﬁts at a state-week level
and compute eligibility for beneﬁts in each week between the time of displacement and the
initial CPS interview (including those paid retroactively due to delayed reauthorizations).
I assume that one week of eligibility has been used for each week of covered unemployment
(including retroactive coverage due to delayed reauthorizations).
In modeling expectations for beneﬁts subsequent to the CPS interview, I assume in my
main speciﬁcations that the individual anticipates no further legislative action or “triggering”
of beneﬁts on or oﬀ after that date, as in Figure 4. Insofar as unemployed individuals are
able to forecast future legislation, I may understate the duration of expected beneﬁts and
overstate the amount of variation across unemployment entry cohorts within the same state.
It is unclear in which direction we would expect this nonclassical measurement error to bias
my results; I explore speciﬁcations aimed at reducing this bias below.
A second limitation of the CPS data is that employment status and unemployment
durations are self-reported, and respondents may not fully understand the oﬃcial deﬁnitions.
Oﬃcially, someone who is out of work, is available to start work, and has actively looked for
work at least once in the last four weeks should be classiﬁed as “unemployed,” with a duration
of unemployment reaching back to the last time he/she was not in this state. Someone who
has not actively searched or is unavailable to start a job is out of the labor force. But the line
between unemployment and non-participation can be blurry, particularly when there are few
suitable job openings to which to apply or when job search is intermittent. The data suggest
that reported unemployment durations often stretch across periods of non-participation
or short-term employment back to the perceived “true” beginning of the unemployment
spell. Reinterviews with CPS respondents in the 1980s indicate important misclassiﬁcation
of labor force status, particularly for unemployed individuals who are often misclassiﬁed
as out of the labor force. This leads to substantial overstatement of unemployment exit
16probabilities (Poterba and Summers, 1984, 1995; Abowd and Zellner, 1985).12 Relatedly,
examination of the unemployment duration distributions indicates substantial heaping at
monthly, semi-annual, and annual frequencies, suggesting that many respondents round their
unemployment durations.
To minimize the misclassiﬁcation problem, my primary estimates count someone who
is observed to exit unemployment in one month but return the following month — that is,
someone whose three-month trajectory is U-N-U or U-E-U — as a non-exit.13 This means
that I can only measure unemployment exits for observations with at least two subsequent
interviews. I have also estimated alternative speciﬁcations that count all measured exits or
that exclude many of the “heaped” observations, with similar results.14 I discuss these issues
at greater length in Section 6.
Finally, the CPS does not attempt to track respondents who change residences between
interviews. Mobility and nonresponse lead to the attrition of roughly 8% of the sample — and
10% of the unemployed respondents — each month. If UI eligibility aﬀects the propensity
to move (Frey, 2009; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011), this could bias my estimates in
unknown ways. However, when I estimate my main speciﬁcations using mobility as the
dependent variable, I ﬁnd no sign that it is (conditionally) correlated with my UI duration
measures.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for my full CPS sample, which pools data for inter-
views between May 2004 and January 2011, matched to subsequent interviews in each of the
next two months. (Rotation groups that would not have been targeted for two follow-up in-
terviews are excluded.) Figure 5 presents average monthly exit probabilities for unemployed
workers who report having been displaced from their previous jobs (as distinct from new
entrants to the labor force, reentrants, and voluntary job leavers) over the sample period.
The overall exit hazard fell from about 40% in mid 2007 to about 25% throughout 2009
12CPS procedures were altered in 1994, in part to reduce classiﬁcation error. There are no public-use
reinterview samples from the post-1994 period. However, my analysis of data supplied by Census Bureau
staﬀ suggests that the misclassiﬁcation of unemployment remains an important issue even after the redesign.
13Fujita (2011) also recodes some U-N-U trajectories as U-U-U. I am grateful to Hank Farber for helpful
conversations about this issue.
14I am unable to address a related potential problem: although the CPS data collection is independent
of that used to enforce job search requirements, these requirements may lead some true non-participants to
misreport themselves as active searchers. This may lead my estimates of the eﬀect of UI on reported labor
force participation to overstate the eﬀect on actual job search.
17and 2010.15 The Figure also reports exit hazards for those unemployed 0-13 weeks and 26
weeks or more. The hazard is higher for the short-term than for the long-term unemployed.
However, both series fell similarly to the overall average in 2007 and 2008, indicating that
only a small portion of the overall exit hazard decline can be attributable to composition
eﬀects arising from the increased share of long-term unemployed with low exit rates.
4 Empirical Strategy
The matched CPS data allow me to measure whether an unemployed individual exits un-
employment over the next month, but do not allow me to follow those who do not exit to
the end of their spells. I thus focus on modeling the exit hazard directly. I assume the
monthly hazard follows a logistic function. To distinguish between the diﬀerent forms of
unemployment exit, I turn to a multinomial logit model that takes reemployment, labor
force exit, and continued unemployment as possible outcomes.
Let nist be the number of weeks that unemployed person i in state s in month t has been
unemployed (censored at 99); let Dist be the total number of weeks of beneﬁts available to
her, including the nist weeks already used as well as weeks she expects to be able to draw
in the future; and let Zst be a measure of economic conditions. Using a sample of displaced






= Dist + Pn (nist; ) + PZ (Zst; ) + s + t: (3)
list is the probability that the individual exits unemployment by month t + 1; as and ht
are ﬁxed eﬀects for states and months; and Pn and PZ are ﬂexible polynomials. This logit
speciﬁcation can be seen as a maximum likelihood estimator of a censored survival model
with stock-based sampling and a logistic exit hazard, with each individual observed for
only two periods.16 However, as I discuss below, modeling survival functions in the CPS
15This is a lower exit rate than is apparent in the BLS gross ﬂows data, which also derive from matched
CPS samples but do not incorporate my adjustment for U-N-U trajectories.
16In principle, individuals can be followed for three periods in the CPS data. (Although the CPS is a
4-period rotating sample, I cannot measure exit between period 3 and period 4 because I require a follow-up
observation to measure temporary exits.) Accounting for this would give rise to a somewhat more complex
likelihood function. I treat an individual observed for three periods as two distinct observations, one on exit
18data is challenging due to inconsistencies between stock-based and ﬂow-based measures of
survival. In Section 6, I develop a simulation approach to recovering survival curves from
the estimated exit hazards that are consistent with the observed duration proﬁle. For now,
I focus on modeling the hazards themselves.
After some experimentation, I settled on the following parameterization of Pn:
Pn (nist; ) = nist1 + n2
ist2 + n 1
ist3 + 1(nist  1)4: (4)
This appears ﬂexible enough to capture most of the duration pattern. I have also estimated
versions of (3) using fully nonparametric speciﬁcations of Pn (nist; ), with little eﬀect on
the results.
As discussed above, the main challenge in identifying the eﬀect of Dist is that it covaries
importantly with labor demand conditions. Absent a source of true random assignment of
Dist, I explore several alternative strategies, aimed at isolating diﬀerent components of the
variation in Dist that are plausibly exogenous to unobserved determinants of unemployment
exit.
My ﬁrst strategy attempts to absorb labor demand conditions through the PZ function.
In my preferred speciﬁcation, PZ is a cubic polynomial in the state unemployment rate. I
also explore richer speciﬁcations that control as well for cubics in the insured unemployment
rate — an alternative measure of unemployment based only on UI-eligible workers — and
the number of new UI claims in the CPS week (expressed as a share of the employed, eligible
population). The remaining variation in Dist comes primarily from the haphazard roll-out
of EUC, which creates variation over time in the relationship between Zst and the number
of weeks of available UI beneﬁts. Additional variation derives from the repeated expiration
and renewal of the EUC program and from state decisions about whether to participate
in the optional EB program. Note that labor demand is likely negatively correlated with
the availability of beneﬁts, so speciﬁcations of PZ that do not adequately capture demand
conditions will likely lead me to overstate the negative eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on job-ﬁnding.
A second strategy uses job seekers who are not eligible for UI, either because they are
from period 1 to period 2 and another on exit from period 2 to period 3 (if she survives in unemployment
in period 2), allowing for dependence of the error term across the observations.
19new entrants to the labor market or because they left their former jobs voluntarily, to control
non-parametrically for state labor market conditions (Valetta and Kuang, 2010; Farber and






= Dist! + eistDist + Pn (nist; eist; ) + eistPZ (Zst; ) + st; (5)
where ast is a full set of state-month indicators and eist is an indicator for whether individual
i is a job loser (and therefore presumptively UI-eligible). Pn(nist; eist; g) represents the
full interaction of the unemployment duration controls (4) with the eligibility indicator,
while eistPZ(Zst; ) indicates that the relative labor market outcomes of job losers and
other unemployed are allowed to vary parametrically with observed labor market conditions.
The Dist measure of the number of weeks available is calculated for everyone, eligible and
ineligible alike, and is entered both as a main eﬀect that will absorb any correlation between
cohort employability and beneﬁts and interacted with the eligibility indicator eist. The
causal eﬀect of UI duration is , and identiﬁed from covariance between UI extensions and
changes in the relative unemployment exit rates of job losers and other unemployed who
entered unemployment at the same time, over and above that which can be explained via
the Zst controls.
This speciﬁcation has the advantage that it does not rely on parametric controls to
measure the absolute eﬀect of economic conditions on job-ﬁnding rates. However, recall that
Figure 2A indicated that the quit rate has been low throughout the recession. If the ineligible
unemployed during the period when beneﬁts were extended are disproportionately composed
of people who have relatively good employment prospects, the evolving prospects of the
population of ineligibles may not be a good guide to those of eligibles, leading speciﬁcation
(5) to overstate the causal eﬀect of UI beneﬁts. I attempt to minimize this by adding controls
for individual covariates — age, education, gender, marital status, and former occupation
and industry — to (5).
My third strategy returns to the eligible-only sample but narrows in on the variation
in UI durations coming from state decisions about which EB triggers to adopt, using a
control function to absorb all other variation in Dist. I augment (3) with a direct control
20for the number of EUC weeks available. This leaves variation only in EB beneﬁts (and,
incidentally, eliminates my reliance on assumptions about job-seekers’ expectations of future
EUC reauthorization, as the EB program is not set to expire). I also add controls for the
availability of EB beneﬁts in the s–t cell under maximal and minimal state participation
in EB (as graphed in Figure 3), along with indicators for the status of each of the four
EB triggers.17 With these controls, the only variation in Dist should come from diﬀerences
among states in similar economic circumstances in take-up of the optional EB triggers.
My ﬁnal strategy turns to an entirely diﬀerent source of variation, focusing on the in-
teraction between the number of available weeks in the state and the number of weeks that
the individual has used to date. Equations (3) and (5) model the eﬀect of UI extensions as
a constant shift in the log odds of unemployment exit, reemployment, or labor force exit;
in some speciﬁcations I allow separate eﬀects on those unemployed more or less than 26
weeks. But this is a crude way of capturing the eﬀects, which the model in Section 2.3
suggests are likely to be strongest for those facing imminent exhaustion that for those for
whom an extension only adds to the end of what is already a long stream of anticipated
future beneﬁts. To focus better on this, I turn to a speciﬁcation that parameterizes the UI






= f (dist; ) +
99 X
v=0
1(nist = v)v + st: (6)
Here, dist = maxf0; Dist   nistg represents the number of weeks of beneﬁts remaining,
with f (; ) a ﬂexible function; I impose only the normalization that f(0; ) = 0, implying
that UI extensions have no eﬀect on job searchers who have already exhausted even their
extended beneﬁts. The second term in (6) is a full set of indicators for unemployment
duration, and the third is a full set of state-by-month indicators. There are two sources of
variation that allow separate identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of d and n, within state-by-month
cells, without parametric restrictions. The ﬁrst is the nonlinearity of the mapping from Dist
and nist to dist: across-(s; t) variation in beneﬁt availability has one-for-one eﬀects on dist
17Three of the triggers are described in note 5. The fourth is is activated when the 3-month moving
average TUR exceeds 8% and is above 110% of the minimum of its one-year and two-year lagged values.
States adopting optional trigger 3 are required to also adopt 4, which when activated provides an additional
7 weeks of EB beneﬁts on top of the normal 13.
21for those who have not yet exhausted beneﬁts but not for those who have. Second, the
EUC expiration rules mean that the addition of new EUC tiers extends d for those who will
transition onto the new tiers before the EUC program expires but not for those with lower
nist who expect the program to have expired before they reach the new tiers.
5 Estimates
Panel A of Table 3 presents logit estimates of equation (3), with standard errors clustered
at the state level. The table shows the unemployment duration coeﬃcient and its standard
error. Below these, it also shows the estimated eﬀect of the UI extensions on the average
exit hazard in the fourth quarter of 2010, computed as the diﬀerence between the average
ﬁtted exit probability and the average ﬁtted probability implied by the model with beneﬁt
durations set to 26 weeks for the entire sample. 18 Column 1 is estimated using only
displaced workers who are presumed to be eligible for UI beneﬁts, and includes state and
month ﬁxed eﬀects and the nist controls indicated by (4), but no controls for economic
conditions in the state. It indicates a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect of UI beneﬁt durations on
the probability of unemployment exit, with a net eﬀect of the UI extensions on the 2010:Q4
exit rate of -2.3 percentage points (on a base of 22.4%). Columns 2–5 add additional controls:
First a control for the state unemployment rate, then a cubic in that rate, then cubics in
three other measures of slackness — the number of UI claimants and the number of new UI
claims, each expressed as a share of insured employment, and the state employment growth
rate — and then ﬁnally a vector of individual-level covariates, including education, age,
marital status, and indicators for previous industry. The estimated UI eﬀects move around
a bit as the covariate vector is expanded, but within a fairly narrow range: The implied
eﬀects of UI expansions on the exit hazard in 2010:Q4 range from -1.7 to -2.3 percentage
points.
Columns 6 and 7 turn to my second strategy, adding to the sample over 60,000 unem-
ployed individuals who left their jobs voluntarily or are new entrants to the labor force and
18Strictly, I use observations from the September–November surveys. December observations are excluded
because the EUC program had expired and not yet been renewed at the time of the December survey; see
Section 2.2.
22are therefore not eligible for UI beneﬁts. As indicated by equation (5), this allows me to add
state-by-month ﬁxed eﬀects.19 I also include an indicator for (simulated) UI eligibility and
its interaction with the duration and unemployment rate controls, as well as a “simulated
UI duration” control that is common to both the job-losers and the job-leavers and designed
to capture any unobserved cohort eﬀects that are common to both groups but correlated
with my UI measure. Column 7 also adds the full vector of individual covariates, as a
guard against the possibility that there are important diﬀerences in employability between
the job-losers and the job-leavers comparison group. With or without these covariates, the
estimates indicate notably smaller eﬀects than in columns 1-5.
There is no particular reason to think that beneﬁt extensions have the same eﬀects on
those near exhaustion as on those just beginning their spells. As a ﬁrst step toward loosening
this assumption, in Panel B I allow Dist to have distinct eﬀects on those unemployed more
and less than 26 weeks. The negative eﬀect of D on unemployment exit is found to be
entirely concentrated among those unemployed 26 weeks or more, with estimated eﬀects on
the shorter-term unemployed that are close to zero, never statistically signiﬁcant, and in
many cases positive. The coeﬃcients for the long-term unemployed are somewhat larger
than in Panel A, though the diﬀerences are small. The implied eﬀects of UI extensions on
exit hazards are smaller than those in Panel A in columns 1–5, but larger in columns 6 and
7, narrowing the gap between the two sets of speciﬁcations.
Table 4 presents several speciﬁcations aimed at gauging the sensitivity of the estimates
to the measurement of expected future beneﬁts. Column 1 repeats the baseline speciﬁcation
from Table 3, Panel B, Column 3. Column 2 replaces the anticipated UI duration measure
with an alternative calculated under the assumption that all recipients expect the EUC
program to be extended seamlessly and indeﬁnitely.20 This leads to larger estimated UI
eﬀects, more than doubling the eﬀect on the monthly exit rate.
Measurement error in the two beneﬁt duration proxies is likely concentrated in the
months shortly preceding expiration of the EUC program, when the two expectations mod-
els yield quite diﬀerent durations; the simulated beneﬁt durations should match recipient
19For computational reasons, I estimate the speciﬁcation by conditional logit, then back out consistent
but ineﬃcient estimates of the st ﬁxed eﬀects for use in predicted exit probabilities.
20This is the measure used by Farber and Valletta (2011).
23expectations much more closely in subsamples where the two expectations models are in
closer agreement. Column 3 presents a speciﬁcation that builds on this intuition. I measure
the absolute diﬀerence between the Ds calculated under the two expectations models, and
interact this diﬀerence with the simulated beneﬁt duration (using my “myopic” expectations
model). I interpret the D main eﬀect in this speciﬁcation — the eﬀect of durations when
the two expectation models are in agreement — as indicating the causal eﬀect of D, and
I interpret the interaction as a measure of the bias due to mismeasurement of D when
EUC expiration approaches. Point estimates for the main eﬀects are intermediate between
those in Columns 1 and 2; the interaction coeﬃcients are negative for both the short- and
long-term unemployed, but are imprecisely estimated.
Column 4 takes a diﬀerent approach to the diﬃculty of forecasting EUC extensions:
I simply control directly for the (simulated) number of EUC weeks available. With this
control the only remaining variation in D comes from EB beneﬁts, which are not directly
dependent upon EUC reauthorization. The estimated UI eﬀects are somewhat larger than
in my baseline speciﬁcation but in the same general range.
Finally, Column 5 turns to my third strategy for identifying the UI eﬀect, using a control
function to isolate variation in EB beneﬁts coming from state decisions about which version
of the EB triggers to use.21 I add to the Column 4 speciﬁcation controls for the status of each
of the four EB triggers and for simulated EB beneﬁts under the most and least generous
versions of the triggers. This inﬂates the coeﬃcients, which indicate that UI extensions
reduced the monthly exit rate by 3.1 percentage points.
Next, I explore the distinction between reemployment and labor force exit. Table 5
reports multinomial logit estimates of several of the speciﬁcations from Tables 3 and 4, using
three outcomes: Continued unemployment (the base case), exit to employment, and exit to
non-participation in the labor force. For the long-term unemployed, the results indicate
that beneﬁt durations have negative, signiﬁcant eﬀects of roughly similar magnitude on
21Identiﬁcation in this speciﬁcation comes from variation in state take-up of a program that was for much
of the period under study entirely funded by the federal government. Insofar states that turned down this
free money — an important consideration seems to be the presence of a governor who was vocally opposed to
federal economic stimulus in 2009 — experienced sharper downturns in labor market conditions (conditional
on my controls), this strategy may lead me to overstate the eﬀect of UI. Of course, an association in the
opposite direction would lead me to understate this eﬀect.
24the logit indexes for both types of unemployment exit. For the short-term unemployed,
estimates indicate positive eﬀects on reemployment and negative eﬀects on labor force exit,
both insigniﬁcant in most speciﬁcations. The bottom rows show the eﬀects of UI extensions
on average exit hazards in 2010:Q4. Beneﬁt extensions appear to lead to larger reductions
in the probability of labor force exit than in the probability of reemployment, reﬂecting in
part the positive point estimates for reemployment of the short-term unemployed. Given
the imprecision in those estimates, however, eﬀects of comparable magnitude on the two
margins are clearly within the conﬁdence intervals.
The multinomial logit model requires the “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (IIA)
assumption, which corresponds to independent risks of reemployment and labor force exit.
This may be incorrect here, particularly if (as in the model in Section 2.3) search eﬀort is
continuous and labor force participation simply corresponds to an arbitrary eﬀort threshold.
However, note that the labor force exit and reemployment eﬀects indicated in the last rows
of Table 5 sum to a net eﬀect on unemployment exit that is, in each column, quite similar
to the eﬀect implied by the corresponding binomial logit model. This is at least suggestive
that violations of IIA are not dramatically biasing the results.
Two additional considerations support the same general conclusion. The most likely
source of IIA violations is unobserved heterogeneity: Individuals with low job-ﬁnding prob-
abilities may be most likely to exit the labor force (and vice versa). Recall from Table 3,
however, that controlling for unobservables has little eﬀect on the estimated UI eﬀects. The
same is true in the multinomial speciﬁcations (compare Column 3 of Table 5, which includes
the individual covariates, with Column 2, which does not). This is at least suggestive that
neglected individual heterogeneity is not driving the results. Second, insofar as heterogeneity
is producing IIA violations, it likely leads me to overstate the negative eﬀect of UI extensions
on reemployment: If extensions dissuade low-job-ﬁnding-probability individuals from labor
force exit, this will reduce average job-ﬁnding rates among the unemployed through a pure
composition eﬀect, on top of any eﬀect operating through UI’s disincentive for intensive
search. My estimates of the reemployment eﬀect will thus be biased downward. As even
the estimated eﬀects in Table 5 are quite small, it seems safe to conclude that UI extensions
have not had large eﬀects on the job-ﬁnding probabilities of the unemployed.
25Table 6 presents a number of alternative speciﬁcations of the multinomial logit regression,
focusing on the implied eﬀects of UI extensions on the 2010:Q4 exit hazards. The ﬁrst
row repeats the results from Table 5, column 2. Row 2 allows the UI eﬀect to diﬀer for
those with initial durations under 26 weeks, exactly 26 weeks, and over 26 weeks, as there
is substantial heaping at 26 in the raw data (due, presumably, to rounding of durations
reported in months). Although point estimates (not shown) show that eﬀects are largest for
those with exactly 26 weeks, this group is not large enough to change the overall average
exit hazards.
Row 3 oﬀers another approach to investigating the impact of duration heaping: I exclude
from my sample anyone who reported a duration of exactly 26, 52, or 78 weeks when ﬁrst
asked about his unemployment spell (in his ﬁrst month in the CPS sample), as well as anyone
who reports an inconsistent duration from one month to the next.22 This leads to larger
eﬀects of UI extensions on labor force exit, but does not change the substantive story. Row
4 excludes individuals who have been unemployed for less than 8 weeks at the ﬁrst survey.
This reduces the precision of the estimates, and a test of the hypothesis that the eﬀects of
UI durations on labor force exit of the short- and long-term unemployed are both zero now
is only marginally signiﬁcant (p=0.06). However, the basic pattern is again similar to that
seen earlier.
Row 5 explores the sensitivity of the result to the deﬁnition of unemployment “exit.”
Where my main speciﬁcations count only exits that don’t backslide into unemployment
the following month, in order to exclude those most likely to be spurious consequences of
measurement error in employment status, this speciﬁcation counts all exits. This allows me
to expand the sample by over 50%, as I only require one follow-up interview to measure
exit. It raises the baseline hazards substantially, particularly for labor force exit, but has
little impact on the estimated eﬀect of UI extensions.
The remaining rows of Table 6 show estimates on diﬀerent subsamples. Rows 6 and 7
show that the eﬀect of UI extensions is concentrated among prime-age workers; for workers
over 55, extensions appear to raise the unemployment exit probability (though only the
22That is, an unemployment duration of 9 weeks in interview 2 would be considered inconsistent unless
the individual reported in interview 1 being unemployed for between 3 and 6 weeks.
26eﬀect on reemployment is statistically signiﬁcant). Rows 8 and 9 show eﬀects by gender;
there is no clear pattern here. Rows 10 and 11 show that the labor force exit eﬀect is con-
centrated among non-college workers, though reemployment eﬀects are similar for more- and
less-educated workers. Finally, rows 12 and 13 show that labor force exit eﬀects are con-
centrated among workers in the construction and manufacturing sectors, where employment
was especially hard hit in the recession, while reemployment eﬀects derive from workers
displaced from other sectors.
Next, I turn to my fourth strategy, as described in equation (6), allowing the eﬀects of
UI durations to operate through the time to exhaustion. As in the baseline speciﬁcations
earlier, I control for state and month indicators and a cubic in the state unemployment rate.
I also include an extremely ﬂexible parameterization of the unemployment duration23. As
discussed in Section 4, the time-until-exhaustion eﬀects are identiﬁed due to variation across
state-month cells in the number of weeks available Dst — with one-for-one eﬀects on dist
only for those whose durations do not exceed the higher D value — and to variation in Dist
across unemployment cohorts within cells due to the projected expiration of EUC beneﬁts
at ﬁxed calendar dates, which means that earlier unemployment cohorts expect to be able
to start more EUC tiers than do later cohorts.
I begin with a multinomial logit speciﬁcation that allows for unrestricted dist eﬀects.
The d coeﬃcients from this speciﬁcation are illustrated as the solid lines in Figure 6.24 The
reemployment coeﬃcients, in the left panel, show a clear pattern of negative coeﬃcients that
are perhaps falling as dist falls toward about 10, then rise toward zero as dist falls further.
This is consistent with the general pattern one would expect from reasonably parameterized
search models (see Section 2.3), with depressed search eﬀort from those with many weeks
left and increasing eﬀort as beneﬁt exhaustion approaches that reaches a maximum value
at the time of exhaustion, with constant search eﬀort thereafter.25 The labor force exit
23The duration density gets thin at above one year, and most respondents seem to round their durations
to the nearest month. I thus include weekly duration indicators for durations up to 26 weeks and monthly
indicators thereafter, plus separate linear weekly duration controls within each of 8 bins (26-30 weeks, 31-40,
41-50, 51-60, 61-70, 71-80, 81-90, and 91-99).
24The maximum value of dist in my sample is 83, but the frequency of individual values above 35 is often
quite low, so I show coeﬃcients only for the lower portion of the distribution.
25The increase in the exit rate as d approaches zero is consistent with the presence of a “spike” in the
exit rate at or near the exhaustion of beneﬁts (i.e., at d = 0 or d = 1; see, e.g., Katz and Meyer, 1990a).
The CPS data are not well suited to the identiﬁcation of sharp spikes, however, as the monthly frequency
27coeﬃcients, in the right panel, show a roughly similar pattern: Negative and fairly stable for
large dist values, rising as dist falls from 10 toward 0. This time, however, the coeﬃcients are
generally positive for the lowest dist values, indicating that those very near exhaustion are
more likely to exit the labor force than are those who have already exhausted their beneﬁts.
This, too, is consistent with the search model presented earlier, which indicated that beneﬁt
exhaustion would trigger labor force exits among at least a subset of UI claimants.26
Based on the pattern of coeﬃcients in Figure 6, I next turn to a semi-parametric spec-
iﬁcation that allows for three duration terms: A linear term in dist; a second linear term
in maxf0; dist   10g that allows for a change in the slope when dist exceeds 10; and an
intercept that applies to all individuals with remaining beneﬁts (i.e. with dist > 0). Es-
timates from a logit speciﬁcation are shown in the ﬁrst row of Table 7. As in Figure 6,
exit rates are lower for those with many weeks of remaining beneﬁts than for those whose
beneﬁts have been exhausted, roughly constant across d greater than 10 — the main d term
and the additional term for d > 10 cancel out — and sharply increasing as d falls from 10
toward 0. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in exit rates between those in their last weeks
of beneﬁts and those who have already exhausted, holding constant the length of the spell.
The rightmost column of Table 7 shows that the implied eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on the UI exit
rate is somewhat smaller than those implied by the earlier estimates.
The second row of Table 7 shows a speciﬁcation that includes a full set of state-by-month
indicators. This yields very similar results to those in the less restrictive speciﬁcation. In row
3, I return to the control variables from row 1, but use a multinomial logit that distinguishes
alternative types of exit from unemployment. (Coeﬃcients from this speciﬁcation are plotted
as dashed lines in Figure 6.) As before, we see substantial eﬀects of UI beneﬁts on both
margins, but the impact on unemployment exit hazards is smaller than in the earlier analyses.
smooths out week-to-week changes.
26In the model, exits occur either immediately upon job loss or upon exhaustion. Thus, the model does
not perfectly ﬁt the data, which show positive rates of labor force exit even for non-exhaustees. The gradual
rise in labor force exit rates as the date of exhaustion approaches is also inconsistent with the model, but
may be explained by an imperfect correspondence between my simulated exhaustion date and the true one.
286 Simulations of the Eﬀect of Unemployment Insurance Ex-
tensions
The results in Tables 3 – 7 indicate that the UI beneﬁt extensions enacted in 2008-2010
reduced both the probability that a UI recipient found a job and the probability that he ex-
ited the labor force, with somewhat larger estimated impacts on the latter than the former.
Moreover, the results are quite stable across a variety of speciﬁcations that exploit diﬀerent
components of the variation in UI beneﬁts. However, the magnitudes are diﬃcult to inter-
pret. This section presents simulations of the net eﬀect of the extensions on labor market
aggregates, obtained by comparing actual unemployment exit hazards with counterfactual
hazards that would have been observed in the absence of UI beneﬁt extensions.
6.1 Stocks and ﬂows in the CPS
Extrapolation of the estimated hazards to the aggregate level requires confronting an impor-
tant limitation of the longitudinally linked CPS data: The exit hazards seen in the data are
inconsistent with the cross-sectional duration proﬁle. Figure 7 illustrates this by plotting
survival curves computed in two diﬀerent ways. The solid line uses the CPS as repeated
cross sections, without attempting to link observations between months. The estimated
survival rate to duration n of the cohort entering unemployment in month m is simply the
ratio of the number of unemployed observations in month m + n with duration n to the
number of unemployed observations in m with duration 0.27 To smooth the estimated rate,
I pool both numerator and denominator across all entrance months in calendar year 2008.
The dotted and dashed lines are Kaplan-Meier survival curves based on unemployment
exit hazards estimated from the linked CPS sample described in Section 3. The survival
rate to duration n is computed as
Qn 1
t=0 p(m + t; t), where p(x; t) represents the share of
unemployed individuals in month x at duration t who remain unemployed in month x + 1.
The dotted line uses two-month panels to estimate p, counting as survivors only those who
27In practice, the unemployment duration measure is in weeks, where the CPS sample is monthly. For
Figure 7, I compute the duration in months as ﬂoor(n=4:3), where n is the duration in weeks and 4.3 is the
average number of weeks in a month. Note also that this construction does not constrain the survival curve
to be downward sloping, and indeed the data show upward slopes at 6, 12, and 18 months, presumably a
reﬂection of rounding in reported durations.
29report being unemployed in the second month (that is, only U-U transitions). The dashed
line uses my preferred survival measure, using a three-month panel to measure persistence
of exits and only counting exits between month 1 and month 2 where the person does not
return to unemployment in month 3 (that is, U-E-E, U-N-N, U-N-E and U-E-N transitions
count as exits between months 1 and 2 but U-E-U and U-N-U cycles are treated as survival
into month 2). As with the cross-sectional curve, both of the Kaplan-Meier curves are
computed by pooling all unemployment entry cohorts from calendar year 2008.
Both of the Kaplan-Meier survival curves are substantially below the curve computed
from repeated cross-section data. The most important contributor to this discrepancy is the
phenomenon highlighted in Section 3: It is not uncommon for an unemployed individual in
month t to report being out of the labor force or employed in t+1 and then unemployed again
(often with a long unemployment duration) in t + 2. While some of these transitions are
real, a large share appear to be artifacts of measurement error in the t+1 labor force status
(Abowd and Zellner, 1985; Poterba and Summers, 1986, 1984). The alternative Kaplan-
Meier survival curve based on the three-month panel substantially reduces the discrepancy
with the repeated cross section data.
Extensive exploration of the CPS data points to two other factors contributing to the
remaining discrepancy. The ﬁrst is so-called “rotation group bias”: The measured unemploy-
ment rate is higher in the ﬁrst month of the CPS panel than in later months, even though
each rotation group should be a random sample from the population (see, e.g., Bailar, 1975;
Solon, 1986; Shockey, 1988). Second, individuals starting a new unemployment spell often
report long durations. This phenomenon is particularly common when the employment spell
that precedes the entry into unemployment is short, suggesting that respondents may be
conﬂating what appear to be distinct spells into a longer super-spell. However, this does not
seem to be a complete explanation. In 2006 and 2007, for example, there are nearly 2,400
respondents observed to be employed for three consecutive months and then unemployed
in the fourth month; 10% of these report unemployment durations in the fourth month of
longer than 6 weeks.
306.2 Reconstructing survival curves consistent with the observed stocks
A full econometric model of measurement error in CPS labor force status and unemployment
durations is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I use ad hoc procedures similar in spirit
to the “raking” algorithm that the Bureau of Labor Statistics uses in constructing the gross
ﬂows data (Frazis et al., 2005) to force consistency between the Kaplan-Meier survival curve
and the cross-sectional duration proﬁle. I take the view that the cross-sectional proﬁle is
correct, and that diﬀerences between this proﬁle and my (adjusted) Kaplan-Meier survival
curve are due to “late entries” into unemployment.28 I use two diﬀerent adjustments; I
argue below that one approach is likely to lead me to somewhat overstate the eﬀect of UI
extensions while the other is likely to understate it.
Let u(m; n; s) be the count of individuals observed in month m in state s with duration
n (in months) obtained from cross-sectional data; let p(m; n; s) represent the probability
that an individual in month m in state s with duration n persists in unemployment by
month m + 1; and let pc (m; n; s) be the counterfactual persistence probability that would
be observed in the absence of unemployment insurance extensions. Both p and pc are
obtained from ﬁtted values from the exit regressions presented in Section 5.
The unemployed at duration n are the survivors from among the unemployed at n   1
one month prior. This creates a link between the u() and p() functions:
u(m; n; s) = u(m   1; n   1; s)p(m   1; n   1; s) + e(m; n; s): (7)
In population data without measurement error, the residual e(m; n; s) would be identically
zero. The actual residual in (7) has two components. The ﬁrst is mean-zero sampling error,
which may cause the number of unemployed in newly entering rotation groups to diﬀer from
the number rotating out. The second is the “late entry” phenomenon discussed above, which
leads to E [e(m; n; s)] > 0 for most n.
We wish to compare u(m; n; s) to the counterfactual unemployment uc (m; n; s) that
would be observed had the persistence probabilities been pc rather than p. To do this,
28The UI system tabulates the number of individuals who exhaust their (regular program) beneﬁts each
month, providing an independent measure of survival. The implied exhaustion rates are much more nearly
consistent with the cross-sectional survival curve than with the Kaplan-Meier curve.
31I assume that entry into unemployment at duration 0 is not aﬀected by UI extensions:
u(m; 0; s) = uc (m; 0; s) for all m and s. My two approaches diﬀer in their assumptions
about the counterfactual values of e(m; n; s).
My ﬁrst approach begins with an expression for u(m; n; s) obtained by recursively
substituting into the right side of (7):
u(m; n; s) = u(m   n; 0; s)
n 1 Y
t=0
p(m   n + t; t; s) + E (m; n; s); (8)
where E (m; n; s) 
Pn
r=1 [e(m   n + r; r; s)
Qn
t=r p(m   n + t; t; s)]. (Hereafter, I sup-
press the month and state subscripts, understanding that increments to duration require
corresponding increments to the month of observation in order to maintain a focus on the
same entry cohort.) In this approach, I assume that the cumulative count of surviving late
entries E (n) is unaﬀected by UI extensions. I estimate ^ E (n)  u(n)   u(0)
Qn 1
t=0 p(t).
This is simply the vertical distance between the solid and long-dashed lines in Figure 7,
evaluated at duration n. I use (8) to construct a counterfactual unemployment count
^ uc1 (n)  u(0)
n 1 Y
t=0
pc (t) + ^ E (n): (9)
My second approach assumes instead that the per-period late entries e(n) are unaﬀected
by UI extensions but that the subsequent persistence of these late entrants is aﬀected.
Following (7), I estimate ^ e(d) = u(n)   u(n   1)p(n   1), then deﬁne the counterfactual
count iteratively as:
^ uc2 (n) = uc2 (n   1)pc (n   1) + ^ e(n): (10)
This can be rewritten to yield an intuitive expression for ^ uc2 (n) in terms of actual counts
u(n) and two adjustments:
^ uc2 (n)  u(n) + u(n   1)[pc (n   1)   p(n   1)] (11)
+

^ uc2 (n   1)   u(n   1)

pc (n   1)
32The ﬁrst adjustment — the second term on the right side of (11) — reﬂects diﬀerences
between the actual and counterfactual scenarios in unemployment persistence at duration
n   1, while the second adjustment — the third term in (11) — captures diﬀerences in exit
at durations t < n   1, multiplied by the probability of surviving from n   1 to n.
Neither assumption about the late entries is particularly plausible. First, there is no
reason to expect that the job search behavior of “late entrants” to unemployment will be
unaﬀected by UI extensions, particularly if these late entrants are in part an artifact of
measurement error in the pre-unemployment labor force status. If the late entrants are in
fact aﬀected, Ec (n) < E (n) and ^ uc1 (n) > uc (n). This implies that the UI eﬀect inferred
from the comparison of u(n) with ^ uc1 (n) will understate the magnitude of the eﬀect of UI
extensions.
On the other hand, insofar as the late entries reﬂect people cycling from unemployment
to non-participation and back, UI extensions that reduce the ﬂow from unemployment into
non-participation would also likely reduce the number of subsequent late entries. This would
imply ec (n) > e(n) and ^ uc2 (n) < uc (n), so a UI eﬀect inferred from the comparison of u(n)
with ^ uc2 (n) will likely overstate the magnitude of the eﬀect of UI extensions on employment.
Thus, there is reason to think that the two counterfactuals should bracket the true eﬀect of
UI extensions (assuming, of course, that the eﬀects of UI extensions on exit hazards obtained
from the speciﬁcations in Section 5 are accurate).29
6.3 Results
Figure 8 presents the two counterfactual simulations of the number of unemployed, using the
model from Table 5, Column 2 to construct p and pc and aggregating across all durations
at each point in time. The solid line shows the actual, non-seasonally-adjusted counts from
the monthly CPS. The two counterfactual simulations ^ uc1 and ^ uc2 are plotted as short and
long dashes, respectively. Counterfactual approach 1 indicates essentially no eﬀect of the UI
extensions, making the short-dashed line hard to distinguish from the solid “actual” series.
29State-by-month level estimates of E (n) and e(n) are extremely noisy. However, national-level monthly
estimates can be obtained by aggregating across states. The time-series relationship between ^ E (n) and
UI beneﬁt durations is robustly negative, consistent with the view that method 1 understates the eﬀect of
UI extensions. The estimated relationship between ^ e(n) and beneﬁt durations is weaker and generally not
statistically signiﬁcant.
33Counterfactual approach 2 oﬀers only a slightly diﬀerent conclusion, suggesting that the UI
extensions increased unemployment in 2010 and early 2011 by about 2.6%.
Table 8 presents more results from the simulations, using each of my four main strategies
to generate predicted exit hazards and then simulating aggregate unemployment and the
long-term unemployment share in January 2011.30 The ﬁrst speciﬁcation is the one graphed
in Figure 8, using a cubic in the state unemployment rate to absorb endogeneity in the
availability of extended UI beneﬁts. The second speciﬁcation uses the comparison of job-
losers to job-leavers reported in Table 3, Column 6 to generate the exit hazards. Third,
I use the control function speciﬁcation from Table 5, Column 5 — identiﬁed from state
decisions about whether and how to participate in the EB program. Finally, I use the
time-to-exhaustion model from Table 7, Row 3.
The estimates indicate that UI extensions raised the number of unemployed in January
2011 by between 5,000 and 759,000, the unemployment rate by 0.1 to 0.5 percentage points,
and the long-term unemployment share by between 0.3 and 2.8 percentage points. In each
case the largest estimates come from counterfactual method 2 and the control function
speciﬁcation; leaving these out, the upper end of the ranges are 370,000 unemployed, 0.2
percentage points on the unemployment rate, and 1.6 percentage points of long-term unem-
ployment. These are much smaller eﬀects than are indicated by the extrapolations discussed
in Section 2.4.
The lower panel of Table 8 presents an alternative and more speculative set of counter-
factual simulations. An important question regarding the eﬀects in Panel B of Table 8 is
whether the eﬀect of UI extensions on unemployment reﬂects reduced job search behavior
or simply reduced labor force exit. As a ﬁrst eﬀort to assess this, I re-run the simulations,
turning oﬀ the eﬀects of UI on the propensity to become reemployed and retaining only
the eﬀects on the labor force exit propensity. Speciﬁcally, let Xist be the observed values
of the explanatory variables and let e and n be the full vectors of covariates from the
employment and non-participation equations, respectively, of the multinomial logit model.
30I count anyone unemployed 6 months or more as long-term unemployed. This means that I generally
include people who report being unemployed for exactly 26 weeks on the survey date, where the BLS long-
term unemployment deﬁnition uses durations of 27 weeks or more. This accounts for the discrepancy between
the baseline long-term unemployment rate in Table 8 and the published rate of 42.2%.
34The one-period survival probability is then pist = [1 + exp(Xiste) + exp(Xistn)]
 1 and
the counterfactual survival probability used for the simulations in Panel B of Table 8 is
pc




ist represents the explanatory variables
in the counterfactual scenario where beneﬁts are ﬁxed at 26 weeks. In Panel C, I use instead
pc0
ist = [1 + exp(Xiste) + exp(Xc
istn)]
 1. Comparisons of simulations based on pist and
pc0
ist reveal how much of the overall eﬀect revealed by the pist-pc
ist comparison is due to labor
force exit. The results in Panel C indicate that just turning oﬀ the eﬀect of UI extensions
on labor force exit reduces unemployment by more than half as much as did turning oﬀ
both UI eﬀects in Panel B.31 In other words, the majority of the eﬀect of UI extensions
on overall unemployment and on long-term unemployment operates through the labor force
exit channel, by keeping people in the labor force who would otherwise have exited, rather
than through reduced reemployment rates.
These last results must be interpreted with some caution, as they rest importantly on the
assumption of independent risks. With this assumption, an individual who is dissuaded from
exiting the labor force in one month has approximately a 13% chance of becoming reemployed
the next month, the same as would an individual who never considered abandoning his job
search. This is probably not realistic; one might expect that the unemployed with the worst
employment prospects are the most likely to exit the labor force. Thus, the results in Table
8, Panel C might overstate the share of the UI eﬀects that is attributable to labor force exit
decisions. Even so, it is clear from Panel B alone that any negative reemployment eﬀect
must be small.
7 Discussion
The design of unemployment insurance policy trades oﬀ generosity to workers who have
experienced negative shocks against the disincentive to return quickly to work created by
the availability of generous non-work beneﬁts. In bad economic times, displacement from a
job is a much larger shock, as it can take much longer to ﬁnd new work. Moreover, insofar
as weak labor markets reﬂect a shortage of labor demand, the negative consequences of
31I do not report estimates for Strategy 2 in Panel C, as the multinomial logit version of this speciﬁcation
is computationally intractable.
35reduced search eﬀort among the unemployed may be relatively small.32 It thus stands to
reason that one might want to extend unemployment insurance beneﬁt durations during
bad times (Landais et al., 2010; Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2011; Schmieder et al., 2011). Such
extensions can have macroeconomic beneﬁts as well, as the unemployed likely have a high
marginal propensity to consume and UI payments thus have relatively large multipliers
(Congressional Budget Oﬃce, 2010).
However, the advisability of long UI extensions depends importantly on the view that
the reduced job search induced by these extensions will not overly slow the labor market
matching process. Many commentators have argued that the 99 weeks of beneﬁts available
through the EUC and EB programs in 2010 and 2011 have gone too far, some pointing to
the apparent outward shift of the Beveridge Curve in 2010 (Elsby et al., 2010) as evidence
that UI extensions have reduced labor supply suﬃciently to noticeably slow the recovery of
the labor market.
It is ultimately an empirical question whether UI extensions lead to large reductions
in job ﬁnding. But the eﬀect of extensions on job ﬁnding rates is hard to identify, because
extensions are usually implemented in response to poor labor market conditions. Fortunately
for the researcher (if not for UI recipients themselves), the haphazard way that the EUC
program was gradually expanded and then repeatedly renewed generates a great deal of
variation in beneﬁt availability that is plausibly exogenous to the demand conditions that
otherwise confound eﬀorts to estimate the beneﬁt duration eﬀect.
Using a variety of comparisons that isolate diﬀerent components of the variation in beneﬁt
availability, I ﬁnd that extended beneﬁts do reduce the rate at which unemployed workers
reenter employment. But the reductions are small, in most speciﬁcations smaller than eﬀects
of extended beneﬁts on labor force exit and always much smaller than what one would have
expected based on older estimates in the literature. The two eﬀects both lead to increases
in measured unemployment, but combined they have raised the unemployment rate by only
about 0.2 percentage points, implying that the vast majority of the 2007–2009 increase in the
unemployment rate was due to demand shocks rather than to UI-induced supply reductions.
32See, e.g., Kroft and Notowidigdo (2011). Schmieder et al. (2011) ﬁnd evidence in Germany, however,
that the reemployment eﬀect of UI durations is relatively constant across the business cycle.
36Moreover, less than half of the small UI eﬀect comes from reduced reemployment rather
than from reduced non-participation (i.e., from increased labor supply).
Any negative eﬀects of the recent unemployment insurance extensions on job search are
clearly quite small, too small to outweigh the consumption-smoothing and equity-promoting
beneﬁts of UI (Gruber, 1997). The latter are likely to be particularly large when the marginal
recipients have been out of work for over a year in conditions where job-ﬁnding prospects are
bleak. Moreover, the estimates herein should be seen as reﬂecting the partial equilibrium
eﬀects of UI, as they do not account for search externalities — when jobs are scarce, a job
claimed by one searcher reduces the probability that other searchers will ﬁnd employment.33
Incorporating these spillovers would make extensions more attractive, as reduced job search
among a subset of the unemployed would not translate one-for-one into reduced employment
but would rather simply shift jobs from the UI recipients to other job seekers (Landais et
al., 2010). The evidence here thus supports the view that optimal UI program design would
tie beneﬁt durations to labor market conditions, to give displaced workers realistic chances
of ﬁnding new employment before their beneﬁts expire.
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Appendix: Proofs of propositions
All proofs are by induction.
Proof of Proposition 1. An individual’s decision problem in state d > 0, holding search eﬀort
for all lower d ﬁxed, is to choose s to maximize
VU (s; d) = u(y0 + b)   s +  [p(s)VE + (1   p(s)VU (d   1))]:
The optimal s is labeled sd, and by deﬁnition satisﬁes VU (sd; d) = VU (d).
Note that the maximization problem is identical when d = 1 as when d = 0. (Compare
equation (1), evaluated at d = 1, with the problem in note 7 — they diﬀer only by an
additive term u(y0 + b)   u(y0) > 0 that is invariant to search eﬀort.) Thus, s1 = s0 and
VU (1)   VU (0) > 0. Second, assume VU (x) > VU (x   1) for some x > 0. Then
VU (x + 1)   VU (x) = VU (sx+1; x + 1)   VU (sx; x)
 VU (sx; x + 1)   VU (sx; x)
=  (VU (x)   VU (x   1))(1   p(sx)) > 0: (12)
Thus, VU (d + 1) > VU (d) for all d.
Proof of Proposition 2. See above for s1 = s0. For d  1, sd satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition
p0 (sd) = 1
(VE VU(d 1)). Proposition 1 thus implies that p0 (sd+1) < p0 (sd), so p00 (s) < 0
implies sd+1 > sd.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ~ sd = arg maxs ~ VU (s; d), where
~ VU (s; d) =
(
u(y0 + b)   s +  [p(s)VE + (1   p(s)VU (d   1))] if s  
u(y0)   s +  [p(s)VE + (1   p(s)VU (d))] if s < ,
and let d = 1(~ sd  ). I show that d+1 6= d for any d > 0 yields a contradiction. Without
loss of generality, suppose that d = d 1 =  = 0; this merely means that we have chosen
the smallest d such that d+1 6= d.
Begin by considering the case where d = 1, so ~ sx   for all x  d. Then an argument
identical to that above implies that the search requirement is never binding: ~ s1 = ~ s0 and
for all x > 0, ~ VU (x + 1)   ~ V (x) > 0 and ~ sx+1 > ~ sx. In particular, ~ sd+1 > ~ sd, so d+1 = 1.
40Next, suppose that d = 0 but d+1 = 1. The former implies that
~ VU (x) = max
s<








u(0)   s + p(s)VE
1    (1   p(s))
(13)
for all 0  x  d. Note that the right-hand side of (13) does not vary with x, so the left
side does not either. In particular, ~ VU (d) = ~ VU (d   1). Moreover, because labor force exit
with s = ~ sd <  is a feasible option with d + 1 weeks of beneﬁts available, it must be the
case that ~ VU (d + 1) > ~ VU (d). Next, note that
~ VU (d) < ~ VU (d + 1)
= ~ VU (~ sd+1; d + 1)




1   p(~ sd+1) ~ VU (d)
i
= ~ VU (~ sd+1; d) +  (1   p(~ sd+1))

~ VU (d)   ~ VU (d   1)

< ~ VU (d) +  (1   p(~ sd+1))

~ VU (d)   ~ VU (d   1)

; (14)
where the ﬁnal inequality follows from a revealed preference argument for beneﬁt duration
d. This implies that ~ VU (d) > ~ VU (d   1), a contradiction.
There are thus only three possible values for the d sequence: d = 1 for all d  0; d = 0
for all d  0; or d =
(
0 if d = 0
1 if d > 0
. Unemployment to non-participation transitions thus
occur only when beneﬁts are exhausted; beneﬁt extensions will delay these transitions for
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I II III IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Jun. 30, 2008 13 Mar. 28, 2009
Nov. 21, 2008 20 13 C Mar. 28, 2009
Feb. 17, 2009 20 13 C Dec. 26, 2009
Nov. 6, 2009 20 14 13 C 6 H Dec. 26, 2009
Dec. 19, 2009 20 14 13 C 6 H Feb. 28, 2010
Feb. 28, 2010 0 0 0 0 n/a
Mar. 2, 2010 20 14 13 C 6 H Apr. 5, 2010
Apr. 5, 2010 0 0 0 0 n/a
Apr. 15, 2010 20 14 13 C 6 H Jun. 2, 2010
Jun. 2, 2010 0 0 0 0 n/a
Jul. 22, 2010 20 14 13 C 6 H Nov. 30, 2010
Nov. 30, 2010 0 0 0 0 n/a
Dec. 17, 2010 20 14 13 C 6 H Jan. 3, 2012
Scheduled EUC 
expiration


















Job leavers / 
entrants / 
reentrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N 95,485 77,913 77,813 61,105
Share matched to one follow-up interview 91% 91% 100% 100%
Share matched to two follow-up interviews 85% 83% 100% 100%
Unemployment duration (spells in progress)
Average (weeks) 22.7 21.8 23.1 22.2
Share 0-13 weeks 54% 59% 54% 59%
Share 14-26 weeks 17% 15% 17% 15%
Share 27-98 weeks 23% 20% 24% 20%
Share 99+ weeks 5% 6% 5% 6%
Share exiting unemployment by next month
Counting all exits (1+ follow-ups)
Total 39% 52% 38% 51%
To employment 23% 20% 23% 20%
Out of labor force 15% 32% 15% 31%
Not counting U-N-U or U-E-U transitions (2+ follow-ups)
Total 30% 42% 29% 41%
To employment 20% 18% 20% 18%
Out of labor force 10% 24% 10% 24%
Anticipated weeks of unemployment benefits
Total 43.9 -- 44.2 --
Remaining 24.1 -- 24.0 --
Total (anticipating EUC reauthorization) 56.7 -- 57.0 --
State unemployment rate 7.7% 6.9% 7.7% 6.9%


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A:  Constant effect of UI across all durations
-0.33 -0.27 -0.31 -0.34 -0.37 -0.15 -0.19
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
-2.1 p.p. -1.7 p.p. -1.9 p.p. -2.1 p.p. -2.3 p.p. -0.9 p.p. -1.2 p.p.
Controls
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Month FEs Y Y Y Y Y
State-by-month FEs Y Y
Unemp duration controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State unemployment rate linear cubic cubic cubic
State insured unemp rate cubic cubic
State new UI claims rate cubic cubic
State employment growth rate cubic cubic
Individual covariates Y Y
Job loser indicator Y Y
Unemployment duration X job loser Y Y
Unemployment rate X job loser Y Y
# of weeks of benefits if elig. Y Y
Panel B:  Allowing effect to vary by individual unemployment duration
Weeks of benefits (/100) X 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.10 0.10 -0.11 -0.13
unemployed < 26 weeks (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.19)
Weeks of benefits (/100) X -0.37 -0.30 -0.34 -0.36 -0.40 -0.19 -0.23
unemployed 26+ weeks (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11)
-1.5 p.p. -1.0 p.p. -1.3 p.p. -1.4 p.p. -1.6 p.p. -1.0 p.p. -1.3 p.p.
Sample is job-losers
Effect of UI extensions on 
avg. exit hazard in 2010:Q4
Effect of UI extensions on 
average exit hazard in 
2010:Q4
# of weeks of UI benefits 
(/100)










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:  Constant effect of UI across all durations
Weeks of benefits (/100) X 0.13 -0.08 0.07 0.02 -0.12
unemployed < 26 weeks (0.15) (0.17) (0.20) (0.26) (0.22)
Weeks of benefits (/100) X -0.34 -0.44 -0.43 -0.48 -0.62
unemployed 26+ weeks (0.09) (0.17) (0.19) (0.34) (0.27)
Weeks of benefits (/100) X  -0.20
UE<26 weeks X (0.62)
abs(expectations range)
Weeks of benefits (/100) X  -0.62
UE<26 weeks X (0.39)
abs(expectations range)
-1.3 p.p. -3.0 p.p. -1.8 p.p. -2.1 p.p. -3.1 p.p.
Controls
State FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Month FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Unemp duration controls Y Y Y Y Y
State unemployment rate cubic cubic cubic cubic cubic
Forecast EUC reauthorization? N Y N N N
EUC weeks available Y Y
EB trigger status Y
EB availability under alternative rules Y
Effect of UI extensions on 













T3, C1 T3, C3 T3, C5 T4, C3 T4, C5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reemployment
Weeks of benefits (*100) X 0.19 0.24 0.18 0.48 0.01
unemployed < 26 weeks (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.33)
Weeks of benefits (*100) X -0.44 -0.42 -0.47 -0.29 -0.64
unemployed 26+ weeks (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.37)
Labor force exit
Weeks of benefits (*100) X -0.19 -0.12 -0.11 -0.41 -0.32
unemployed < 26 weeks (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.45) (0.26)
Weeks of benefits (*100) X -0.38 -0.34 -0.42 -0.55 -0.58
unemployed 26+ weeks (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.37) (0.34)
Effect of extensions on average hazards in 2010:Q4
Reemployment -0.6 p.p. -0.5 p.p. -0.7 p.p. 0.2 p.p. -1.2 p.p.
Labor force exit -1.2 p.p. -1.0 p.p. -1.2 p.p. -2.0 p.p. -1.8 p.p.

























Effect of UI 
extensions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Alternative specifications & samples
(1) Baseline 13.4% -0.5 p.p. 9.0% -1.0 p.p.
(2) Separate effect on 26 wks 13.4% -0.5 p.p. 9.0% -1.0 p.p.
(3)
Drop round number & inconsistent 
durations 12.8% -0.5 p.p. 7.9% -1.5 p.p.
(4) Drop very short durations 14.2% +0.1 p.p. 9.6% -1.1 p.p.
(5) Count all UE exits 16.5% -0.6 p.p. 13.7% -1.3 p.p.
Subsamples
Age
(6) Age 25-54 (N=53,104) 14.4% -1.0 p.p. 7.5% -1.8 p.p.
(7) Age 55+ (N=13,990) 11.6% +1.4 p.p. 9.7% +0.5 p.p.
Gender
(8) Men (N=47,782) 13.7% -0.2 p.p. 7.3% -1.2 p.p.
(9) Women (N=30,031) 13.0% -1.0 p.p. 11.7% -0.8 p.p.
Education
(10) HS or less (N=43,628) 13.3% -0.4 p.p. 10.0% -1.8 p.p.
(11) Some college or more (N=34,185) 13.7% -0.5 p.p. 7.8% -0.1 p.p.
Industry
(12) Const./manuf. (N=25,584) 14.2% +0.4 p.p. 7.4% -2.1 p.p.
(13) All other industries (N=52,229) 13.1% -0.9 p.p. 9.7% -0.4 p.p.















max(0,         
# of weeks - 
10)




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Logit for unemployment exit
(1) 0.12 -0.36 0.39 -0.7 p.p.
(0.08) (0.10) (0.11)
(2) 0.10 -0.33 0.37 -0.5 p.p.
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
(3) Multinomial logit with state, month, UR controls
Reemployment -0.03 -0.29 0.35 -0.0 p.p.
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Labor force exit 0.20 -0.36 0.35 -0.6 p.p.
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
Logit for unemployment exit 
with state, month, UR controls
Logit for unemployment exit 














Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2 Method 1 Method 2
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel A:   Baseline
Actual in January 2011
Panel B:  Full effect of UI extension
Strategy 1 (Table 5, Col. 2) +87 +370 +0.1 p.p. +0.2 p.p. +0.5 p.p. +1.6 p.p.
Strategy 2 (Table 3, Col. 6) +131 +297 +0.1 p.p. +0.2 p.p. +0.3 p.p. +0.9 p.p.
Strategy 3 (Table 5, Col. 5) +283 +759 +0.2 p.p. +0.5 p.p. +0.9 p.p. +2.8 p.p.
Strategy 4 (Table 7, Row 3) +5 +226 +0.0 p.p. +0.1 p.p. +0.6 p.p. +1.5 p.p.
Panel C:  Effect operating through labor force participation
Strategy 1 (Table 5, Col. 2) +98 +264 +0.1 p.p. +0.2 p.p. +0.3 p.p. +0.9 p.p.
Strategy 3 (Table 5, Col. 5) +183 +476 +0.1 p.p. +0.3 p.p. +0.5 p.p. +1.6 p.p.
Strategy 4 (Table 7, Row 3) +92 +208 +0.1 p.p. +0.1 p.p. +0.3 p.p. +0.8 p.p.
Level (1,000s) Rate
Long-term unemp. 
share
Unemployment
14,937 9.0% 45.5%